Polybius and the Background of the Second Punic War’s Outbreak

This source is a passage from Book 3, Chapter 30 of Polybius’ Histories on the causes of the Second Punic War. It argues that both sides are to blame for the war, giving reasons why. The Spanish city of Saguntum had placed itself under Roman protection since they had turned to the Romans to solve political strife and stabilize their city. Since the Carthaginians had destroyed Saguntum, Polybius argues that they are guilty of starting the war according to both the treaty of Lutatius, in which the allies of both powers were to be protected from attacks by the other, and the agreement with Hasdrubal which prohibited the Carthaginians from crossing the Ebro in arms. However, Polybius concedes that the Carthaginians had legitimate grievances with Rome because they had Sardinia taken from them by the Romans and were forced to pay an indemnity, so they were trying to to get payback.[1] Polybius is trying to be objective by taking the views of both sides into account.

The terms of the treaty of Lutatius, signed at the end of the First Punic War in 241 BC, demanded that the Carthaginians withdraw from Sicily and avoid war on Hiero or the Syracusans and their allies. The Carthaginians had to give the Romans all prisoners without ransom and pay them 2,200 Euboic talents over 20 years. Later, stricter terms halved the time of payment, added 1,000 talents to the amount and forced the Carthaginians to leave all islands between Italy and Sicily.[2] The allies of each power were secured from attack by the other, and neither power could impose contributions, construct public buildings, recruit soldiers in the others’ territory, or ally with the other’s ally.[3] The Carthaginians could not pay their mercenaries due to the indemnity. So the mercenary army assembled in North Africa revolted, and the mercenaries in Sardinia later did the same. The Carthaginians put down the North African revolt and planned to move on to Sardinia, but the Romans intervened and threatened war unless Carthage relinquished Sardinia and paid another high indemnity to the amount of 1,200 talents. The depleted Carthaginians relented. Rome also took Corsica.[4] This essay will focus on Saguntum and the Ebro treaty’s relation to the start of the Second Punic War because it’s a more immediate event and a catalyst for the beginning for the war.

The Carthaginians looked to Spain for compensation. They had long been interested in Spain, as they not only hired Iberian mercenaries, but also harvested the gold, silver and timber there. They tried to expand their power and access to resources in the peninsula. The Romans caught eye of this, and diplomatic activity occurred there. Despite constant attempts to delineate their spheres of influence through treaties, the Romans and Carthaginians often meddled with each other. In 226, the Romans, for obscure reasons, sent an embassy to Hasdrubal to ask that he limit Carthaginian influence. The result was the Ebro treaty mentioned by Polybius.[5] Livy wrote that this treaty affirmed the one of 241 and laid down the River Ebro as the boundary for each empire, while protecting the independence of Saguntum between the 2 empires.[6] But Polybius writes that the treaty with Hasdrubal said nothing about the rest of Spain outside of the Ebro. He denies the idea later pushed by Livy that the treaty gave specific protection to Saguntum or recognized it as a Roman ally. The Romans may have invented this idea because there was no other proof that there was an alliance between Rome and Saguntum.[7]

The senate claimed that the city was somehow allied to Rome or dependent on its protection, but the way the relationship developed is unknown.[8] It is not likely that the alliance between Rome and Saguntum was formal. Polybius says that the Saguntines offered themselves into the fides of Rome in an act of deditio, although he would have used Greek terms as that was his native language.[9] Sometime in the late 220s, the still independent Saguntum saw civil strife caused by disagreements on what policy to adopt towards the Carthaginians. Later Rome was chosen to arbitrate. Rome may have been chosen because anti-Carthaginians occupied key positions in Saguntum, but also because there was a hesitancy to allow any kind of locus standi to the Carthaginians.[10] Saguntum, like many ancient cities, was torn by political conflict, and each faction relied on outside help. Although the pro-Romans were more powerful, they felt threatened enough by the pro-Carthaginians to seek Roman help.[11] The treaty with Hasdrubal defined the north of the Ebro as Roman territory and the south as Carthaginian, but Saguntum was south. Polybius mentions that the agreement with Saguntum was several years before Hannibal took up command of Spain in 221.[12] Contemporary Roman leaders likely knew that Saguntum was south of the Ebro, while the misconception that it was north may have only later become widespread in Rome. Polybius provides another possible answer that the Romans only came up with legal arguments for the war after it began, with Saguntum as part of them. He says earlier that he does not agree that the fall of Saguntum and the crossing of the Ebro are causes of the war, only their beginnings.[13] If there was no official treaty with Saguntum, the Romans would have been justified to go to war just because Hannibal had crossed the Ebro, without need to reference the city. Since the Romans had to try and craft a justification for war through two separate actions of Hannibal, his taking of Saguntum and his crossing the Ebro, this gives rise to strong doubts of whether the Romans could justify a war.[14] Roman sources are abundant and explain the causes of the war very well. However, Carthaginian sources have not survived.[15] Polybius’ evidence about the declaration of war to Carthage comes down 3 points: the actual ultimatum, a mention of a breach of faith, which may be the treaty of Lutatius, and the belief that the war was caused by Saguntum’s destruction.[16]

Hannibal may have attacked Saguntum because he believed that it was necessary to safeguard Carthaginian interests.[17] The siege of Saguntum began in the middle of May 219 and ended in late December or until well into January 218.[18] When Saguntum was attacked, the Roman senate merely debated and sent embassies.[19] Before the Romans declared war, the senate had considered all possible scenarios. Rome had gained power since the First Punic War, and had a strong position against Carthage, but it still exercised caution.[20] Opinions could have been very divided: one argument could be that the Romans had no obligations or business getting involved with Saguntum and that they may be in the wrong. A counter-argument is that Rome had the moral imperative to help, that Saguntum could check Carthaginian power and that failure to act could drive other small states to yield to Carthage.[21] Livy combines the fall of Saguntum and Hannibal’s invasion of Italy into one consular year, 218, which shortened the course of events and allowed the Romans the excuse of not having time to aid the Saguntines.[22] Another reason they delayed for a whole year between their initial warning to Hannibal and their declaration of war was because of internal political struggles. The Claudian faction was attempting to take power from the Aemilian-Scipionic faction which had dominated for a few years. The Scipionic group advocated war with Carthage but was prevented by both the Fabian group and the Claudians. Finally, a compromise was reached where the Claudian Tiberius Sempronius Longus was elected consul with Publius Scipio, while the Claudians started to support the Aemilian-Scipionic group in war against Carthage.[23] There may have been a delay of four weeks between Rome receiving the news of Saguntum’s fall in mid-February and the embassy’s departure.[24] The senate then demanded the handover of Hannibal, but Carthage refused.[25] The Romans had an emotional reaction that superseded any petty political divisions within Rome and galvanized them to fight against Carthage.[26]

When the Romans declared war in 218, they sent their embassy directly to Carthage.[27]  Between the capture of Saguntum and his leaving New Carthage in the spring of 218, Hannibal may have set up his campaign of 218 and also given leave to his Spanish auxiliaries.[28] Polybius revealed that Hannibal knew about the declaration of war before leaving New Carthage. But the Romans did not leave until summer. Hannibal crossed the Rhone and Publius Scipio arrived in Massilia in middle to late August. Since Scipio made the voyage by sea, he must have left Rome before late July, a significant delay from March. At least one event may have caused a delay: some of Scipio’s troops were redirected to Cisalpine Gaul to protect the new colonists of Placentia and Cremona against the Boii, meaning that Scipio had to assemble a new force before leaving. This may have caused a month’s delay. The other consul Sempronius may have also started late, as he needed to make significant preparations at Lilybaeum and later went on two expeditions including the capture of Malta.[29]

It can be concluded that the immediate catalysts for Rome declaring war involved Saguntum more than anything. The city had acquired at least some importance to the Romans. It took a while for the Romans to act for many reasons, but the destruction of Saguntum drove them to go to war against the Carthaginians, although both the arrival of the news and preparations made the Romans delay as well. While Polybius is thinking of long-term causes, immediate catalysts can be said to be more important to the outbreak of the Second Punic War.

Bibliography

Astin, A.E. “Saguntum and the Origins of the Second Punic War.” Latomus vol 26. July-September 1967. 577-596.

Boatwright, M.T, Gargola, D. J, Lenski, N, Talbert, R. J. A. The Romans: From Village to Empire. A History of Rome from Earliest Times to the End of the Western Empire, Second Edition. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Dorey, T. A. “The Treaty with Saguntum.” Humanitas vol 11-12. 1959-60.

Hoyos, Dexter ed. A Companion to the Punic Wars. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.


[1] Polybius Histories 3.30.1-4 in, Ancient Rome: Social and Historical Documents from the Early Republic to the Death of Augustus, Second Edition ed. M. P. J. Dillon, L. Garland (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 178-79.

[2] Ibid, Polybius Histories 1.61.8-63.3, 171-72.

[3] Ibid, Polybius Histories 3.27.1-10, 172.

[4] M. T. Boatwright, D. J. Gargola, N. Lenski, R. J. A. Talbert, The Romans: From Village to Empire. A History of Rome from Earliest Times to the End of the Western Empire, Second Edition (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 97.

[5] Ibid, 100.

[6] Livy History of Rome 21.2.7 in Ancient Rome, 179.

[7] T.A. Dorey, “The Treaty with Saguntum,” Humanitas vol 11-12 (1959-60), 4.

[8] Boatwright, The Romans, 100.

[9] Hans Back, “The Reasons for the War” in A Companion to the Punic Wars, ed. Dexter Hoyos (Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 230-31.

[10] A.E. Astin, “Saguntum and the Origins of the Second Punic War,” Latomus vol 26 (July-September 1967), 593-94

[11] Dorey, “Treaty”, 3.

[12] Back, “Reasons”, 230.

[13] Astin, “Saguntum”, 587-88.

[14] Dorey, “Treaty”, 7.

[15] Back, “Reasons”, 228-29.

[16] Astin, “Saguntum”, 588.

[17] Ibid, 595.

[18] Ibid, 581.

[19] Back, “Reasons”, 231.

[20] Ibid, 227.

[21] Astin, “Saguntum”, 595.

[22] Back, “Reasons”, 231.

[23] Dorey, “Treaty”, 8.

[24] Astin, “Saguntum”, 583.

[25] Boatwright, The Romans, 100.

[26] Astin, “Saguntum”, 580.

[27] Back, “Reasons”, 236.

[28] Astin, “Saguntum”, 582.

[29] Astin, “Saguntum”, 584.

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